https://academic.oup.com/whq/advancearticle/doi/10.1093/whq/why135/5231578?guestAccessKey=e2ea54c6-af2b-4eaa-b13d-54553eae2752
Like a historical mantra repeated time and again, it is asserted that the Louisiana Purchase doubled the size of the United States.
1 As this assertion takes for granted that the Purchase included the entire Missouri watershed, it rests on the assumption that
France had a valid title thereto because, as a matter of common sense and international law, France could only convey title to territory that it actually owned. 2 But what basis is there for the assumption that France had sovereign title to the vast territory drained by the Missouri River that stretches from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains? In actual fact, at the time of the Purchase in 1803 most of that territory had not even been explored, let alone possessed, by the French -it was occupied and controlled by many Indian nations, over whom France exercised no authority. As France clearly did not exercise de facto sovereignty over the Missouri watershed, any claim it had to the vast territory would have had to be a claim to de jure sovereignty based on law that did not depend on actual occupation and control. France legal title to this immense territory, most of which no Frenchman had ever laid eyes on? This article will probe, and attempt to answer, the troubling and too often neglected question of France's title to the Missouri watershed. Our discussion and analysis will rely on the vital distinction between de facto and de jure sovereignty.
Assessing claims to de facto sovereignty is an empirical matter that depends on actual possession, control, and exercise of authority on the ground. As such, it is a subject for historical investigation. Assessment of claims to de jure sovereignty, on the other hand, necessarily involves deciding at the outset which body of law to apply, which raises a normative issue of moral and political philosophy: Which body of law should apply in the circumstances? 3 Once that has been determined, a de jure assessment entails legal analysis in accordance with relevant principles and rules from the chosen body of law.
While this analysis will obviously take known historical facts into account, it must be kept clearly in mind that, unlike de facto sovereignty, de jure sovereignty is a matter of mixed fact and law, not to be determined by historical methodology alone. In other words, it depends on the application of a particular body of legal rules to ascertained facts. This article will critically assess the validity of France's claim to territorial sovereignty over the Missouri watershed from both a de facto and a de jure perspective.
This assessment will lead to a re-evaluation of the geographical extent of the Louisiana Purchase on the Northern Plains.
Sovereignty and the Indian Nations
Considered factually, sovereignty entails the actual exercise of political or governmental authority over peoples, or more commonly over peoples and territories (hence the term "territorial sovereignty") that are subject to that authority. De facto sovereignty's essential characteristic is the existence of an organized society that has political authority and is factually independent. 4 Claims to de facto sovereignty can be assessed on this basis in historical and present contexts by factual investigation. As there is no need to resort to law, the criteria for de facto sovereignty can be applied universally, without entering into the normative question of whether it is appropriate to apply a particular body of law to a given people or territory.
In this context, it is also essential to distinguish between territorial sovereignty and title to land. Whereas the former involves the exercise of governmental authority by a political entity (the sovereign), the latter is a form of property that can be held, in Euro- Given that the essential ingredient of de facto sovereignty is the existence of an organized, independent political society, there can be no doubt that the Indigenous peoples of North America were sovereign. Prior to European colonization, they were organized as nations and exercised independent authority over their internal and external affairs, as well as over specific territories. 10 This reality was in fact accepted by Chief America, 1713 -1824 (Minneapolis, 1974 Anand, above n.7, 19-31; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, 2005 (Washington, 2001) , especially the map at ix, and works cited in n.10 above. 18 See Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States (Boston, 2014), especially 25. Although the political and social organization of these nations varied greatly from that of European nations, de facto sovereignty depends, not on internal organization, but on effective control by independent political entities over peoples, or more commonly over peoples and territories, the boundaries of which do not need to be fixed or clearly defined. See the works cited in n.4 above.
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In addition to the works cited in n. 1819 -1841 (Berkeley, 1914 E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759 -1804 (1934 , reprinted Norman, 1974 territory and that it validly conveyed that title to the United States in 1803. My concern is with the boundaries of the transferred territory, particularly in the north and west, and the assumption that the territory encompassed the whole of the Missouri watershed. This involves tracing France's title back to its origins, and evaluating this assumption in light of the de facto sovereignty of the Indian nations who inhabited the region.
The treaty between France and the United States that gave effect to the Louisiana Purchase is of no real assistance in determining the territory's extent. Despite deliberate attempts by Robert Livingston and James Monroe, the American negotiators in Paris, to get a definition of the boundaries in the treaty, the French refused to provide one. Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy (Gloucester, MA, 1962), 176-86. and the "island" on which it stands, what was the country that France possessed as Louisiana? 27 In attempting to answer this question, it is important to distinguish between the territory France claimed to possess and the territory she actually possessed. The assumption that the Louisiana Purchase encompassed the whole of the Missouri watershed is based on France's de jure territorial claim, not on the extent to which she was actually able to make good on that claim by taking de facto possession. 28 It is therefore essential to undertake an assessment of the validity of France's claim to the entire Missouri watershed, which depends in turn on the factual and legal bases for that claim.
France's Claim to the Missouri Watershed
French explorers, missionaries, and fur-traders were the first Europeans to make contact This memorandum was based on a longer memorandum prepared by Rayneval, apparently with Vergennes's approval, while Jay was negotiating with the Conde de Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador to France, over the location of what might become the boundary between the United States and Spanish Louisiana (on these negotiations, see DeConde, above note 18 at 35-40). The original French versions of these memoranda, along with a record of the negotiations between Jay and Aranda, are in Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Rayneval Memoranda of 1782 on Western Boundaries and Some Comments on the French Historian Doniol" (1937) 47:1 Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society (New Series), 15 at 19-21, 42-79, and 24-37, respectively. In the September 6 memorandum, Rayneval claimed as well that England, in negotiations with France in 1755 over the limits of their respective territories in North America, regarded the Indigenous peoples ("Peuplades sauvages") between the territory claimed by England and the Mississippi as independent: ibid. at 19. Similarly, in his record of the negotiations with Jay, Aranda noted that on all the maps "the region beyond the main boundary lines of the [English] colonies is savage country, to which both of us parties have equally good, or indeed equally unreasonable rights": ibid. at 27 (Bemis's translation, my emphasis). "Few ministers plenipotentiary," stated Jay [in reference to the territory between the southern Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi that Aranda claimed should not be part of the United States], "have discretionary powers to transfer and cede to others the country of their sovereigns." "But, it isn't your country," insisted Aranda. "What right have you to the territory of the free and independent Indians?" "The right of preëmption over them, and of sovereignty over them in respect to other nations, the same as His Catholic Majesty in Mexico and Peru," Jay answered. I considered our right of pre-emption of the Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right whatsoever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever. (Berkeley, 1994) , 227. However, Jefferson later showed some ambivalence on the issue of Indian sovereignty. In a letter to Meriwether Lewis, dated 22 January 1804, he stated in relation to Louisiana: "Being now become sovereigns of the country, without however any diminution of the Indian rights of occupancy we are authorised to propose to them in direct terms the institution of commerce with them." He instructed Lewis to inform the Indian nations "through whose country you will pass" that the Americans had now replaced the Spanish and the French as the Indians' "fathers and friends", and that the Americans desired to continue friendly trading relations with them. Donald Jackson, ed. Georgia that the doctrine of discovery applied only among the European nations that had agreed to it, and could not affect the pre-existing rights of the Indian nations, including their right to independence. It also explains why France, England, and the United States negotiated treaties with the Indian nations, rather than just entering into real estate transactions with them to acquire their lands: these nations had, and to some extent continue to have, sovereignty, and so the colonizing powers had to negotiate with them on a nation-to-nation basis. The western posts of the French, all but the main bases Niagara, Detroit, Michilimackinac, and eventually, Grand Portage, consisted of little more than a three-to four-meter-high log palisade thirty-odd meters long on each side, enclosing four or five clay-chinked log cabins with bark roofs. The "presents" that the French were constrained to give the Indian nations every year were regarded by the latter as a form of rent for the use of the land where the posts stood and as a fee for the right to travel on the Indians' territory. The reality was that the French lacked both the capacity and the desire to exercise control over the territories of the Indigenous peoples who were their commercial partners and with whom they needed to maintain cordial and respectful relations. But if, at the same time, the French were able to keep rivals out by asserting sovereignty over these territories vis-à-vis other European nations, they would be able to monopolize the fur trade and retain the benefit of it for themselves.
The second body of law we have identified as relevant to the issue of de jure sovereignty in the Missouri watershed at the time of the Louisiana Purchase is the law of the Indian nations. Their law would be much more apposite than French law because they actually inhabited the region and did exercise de facto sovereignty. Included would be both the internal law of the various Indian nations, and any inter-nation law developed to govern their diplomatic and commercial relations with one another. 44 While ascertaining the content of these bodies of law prior to European exploration of the Missouri watershed is no easy task, due in part the temporal distance of well over two centuries and the fact that these societies relied on oral traditions rather than writing to record their (Norman, 1941) . However, this account, based on twentieth century field work, does not necessarily reflect Cheyenne law prior to 1803, as legal systems are not static. 45 See Gary E. Moulton, ed., The Definitive Journals of Lewis & Clark (Lincoln, 1986-93) , especially vols. 3-4; James P. Ronda, Lewis and Clark among the Indians (Lincoln, 1984) , 16-132; Josephy, above n.19; John C. Ewers, "Plains Indian Reactions to the Lewis and Clark Expedition", in James P. Ronda, ed., Voyages of Discovery: Essays on the Lewis and Clark Expedition (Helena, 1998), 171. As Ewers points out, prior to Lewis and Clark the Europeans the Indian nations would have met on the Missouri were mostly traders, so they would have regarded these new arrivals in the same way.
some Northern Plains Indian nations well into the nineteenth century is further evidence of their tenacious belief in their own independence.
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As for the law of nations, in the seventeenth century it was still in its infancy. We have also seen that it was not "international" in any global sense -instead, it was a European body of law developed in part to regulate the acquisition of overseas colonies by the European powers. As such, its application would have been limited to the European nations. It would not bind the Indian nations of the Missouri watershed who did not participate in its formation and did not consent to be subject to it. … the practice of nations, on making discoveries in America, has sanctioned a principle that "when a nation takes possession of any extent of sea-coast, that possession is understood as extending into the interior country to the sources of the rivers emptying within that coast, to all their branches, and the country they cover." I. Mem. de l'Amerique 116. The French Commissioners admitted that the limits of Acadia had never been determined, so it was up to the commissioners to establish the boundary. They suggested a watershed boundary because it was the usual and most convenient approach. For Britain's response, Anglo-America, 1492 -1763 (New York, 1967 Although President at the time, Jefferson's opinion on the question of the territorial extent of France's de jure sovereignty in Louisiana was just that, an opinion lacking international legal authority. Moreover, despite his broad-ranging legal curiosity and learning, Jefferson was not a law of nations jurist, and as he admitted his opinion was based on the limited resources available in his library.
Portuguese, for example, relied heavily on discovery and the grants they had received by papal bulls, whereas the French and the English favored methods such symbolic acts and royal charters that promoted their own interests.
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French claims derived from La Salle's 1682 expedition were based upon discovery and his formal declaration of possession, which he attempted to fortify by alleging the consent of the Indian nations he had encountered. As a means of asserting sovereignty, discovery was sometimes relied upon by the French and English to counter Iberian claims based on prior papal grants. 51 However, while discovery combined with a formal declaration of sovereignty may have accorded some priority to the discovering power as against other European nations, unless followed by actual possession within a reasonable time its value even in that context expired. 52 It is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which France was able to make good on La Salle's actions by effectively occupying the territory he claimed. Legal and Diplomatic History (1927, reissued Port Washington, NY, 1971), 47-119. 51 Spain did rely on papal grants to dispute La Salle's claims, especially after he attempted to establish a settlement at Matagorda Bay in 1685: see Caruso, above n.29, 225. 52 Early jurists rejected discovery as a means of acquiring sovereignty over territory inhabited by Indigenous peoples: see Francisco de Vitoria, De indis et de ivre belli relectiones, 1557, trans. by J. Bate (Washington, 1917), 139; Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, 1625, trans. by Francis W. Kelsey (New York, 1925) , 550. By the nineteenth century, however, discovery was thought by some to confer an inchoate title against other Europeans that could be consummated by occupation: see discussion of Marshall C.J.'s judgments in text accompanying notes 11-16 above; Hall, above n.9, 98-100; Lindley, above n. 50, 129-38. 53 France's claim by discovery alone would be all the weaker because Spaniards actually explored parts of the Lower Mississippi Valley earlier: see above n.33. 54 Caruso, above n.29, 220. See Morris S. Arnold, Unequal Laws Unto a Savage Race: European Legal Traditions in Arkansas, 1686 -1836 (Fayetteville, AR, 1985 , 5-6. Claims to territory adjacent to or inland from a seacoast or river mouth that is actually possessed are based on geographical contiguity, and are thus said to depend on the contiguity (or hinterland) doctrine. Significantly, in the first half of the nineteenth century the main proponent of an expansive interpretation of this doctrine was the United
States itself, first in its dispute with Spain over the south-western boundary of Caruso, above n.29, 237. 58 Jefferson, above n.47, 260-61. 59 See Hall, above n.9, 103-5, and works cited in n.20 above.
American diplomats self-interestedly contended for a watershed application of the contiguity doctrine, but ultimately compromised these claims of the United States by accepting other boundaries.
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As the nineteenth century progressed, international jurists debated both the validity and the meaning of the contiguity doctrine. If anything like a consensus was reached, it was that claims to a watershed based on possession of a sea-coast or river mouth had to be reasonable. While geographical contiguity might be used to claim a drainage basin up to a not-too-distant range of mountains, the doctrine could not be used to claim vast territories that extended far beyond the effective occupation and control of the colonizing nation, especially where possession of a river mouth did not prevent access to the interior by other routes.
62 This had to be especially so in situations where the interior was not vacant, but was in fact occupied by Indian nations. 63 As a consequence, American claims to the entire Mississippi and Columbia watersheds on the basis of possession of the mouths of those rivers were generally rejected by international jurists. Transnat'l Law 403, Nineteenth century jurists' disregard of Indigenous peoples in this context has been rendered untenable by the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J.R. 12, advising that the territories of socially and politically organized peoples, even if nomadic, were not terra nullius and so could not be acquired simply by European occupation. Consequently, discussions of the contiguity concept in modern international law limit it to vacant territory (Antarctica, uninhabited islands, and maritime areas): see Surya P. (London, 1911) , at 156-57; Lindley, above n.50, 277-80. These authors distinguish between occupation of a coastal strip, which could give sovereignty up to a proximate height of land, and occupation of a river mouth, which would not give sovereignty over an extensive watershed. However, one respected jurist dismissed both these applications of the contiguity doctrine as "fanciful", stating the general rule to be "that occupation reaches as far as it is effective": L. Effective occupation, by means of the exercise of jurisdiction through enforcement of laws and administrative control as well as by physical presence, became the international law standard for assessing claims to sovereignty from at least the last half of the 18 th century: see Emmerich de Vattel, above n.5, 85; Rayneval, above n. 35, vol. 1, 293; Jennings, above n.62, [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] (Washington, 2014) .
